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Abstract 
This paper argues that the core principle of bioethics, autonomy, is rooted both in the 20th 
century history of the development of new medical technologies as in political liberalism 
transferred to medical practices, rendering the medical decision-making of patients a 
centerpiece of medical interventions. The paper shows how the ambiguity in the 
interpretation of autonomy reflects the ambivalence of bioethics towards making normative 
claims on the moral agents insofar as these go beyond the respect for a patient’s autonomy. In 
the second part, the paper analyzes the alternative approach of care ethics, which intends to 
emphasize both the vulnerability and dependency of the patient and the medical professions’ 
responsibility to care for the patient. However, neither ‘autonomy’ nor ‘care’ ethics 
approaches can address the social and institutional mediations of today’s health care ethics; 
the paper therefore concludes with a proposal to embrace a critical social-ethical approach to 
bioethics that is based on the tradition of human rights.   
 




Societal practices, including numerous practices in the health care sector, have radically 
changed during the second half of the 20th century. The changes certainly concern human 
reproduction, the prolonging of life with the help of modern medical technologies, and the 
social practices surrounding the process of dying. Even the concept of life and death have 
changed over the course of the last century, and a utilitarian economic reason that 
accompanied modern industrial societies since the 19th century, has reached the sphere of 
medicine, too: how we handle the human body in medical prevention, diagnosis, and therapy 
echoes the automation of other non-medical technical processes; the human corpse is more 
and more utilized for organ transplantation; but also body parts such as blood, sperm or egg 
cells, or human tissue are used in the ever-demanding processes of medical cures. Modern 
society’s hospitals sometimes resemble large industrial complexes, and even small medical 
practices may use more technical devices than a person might ever see in his or her everyday 
life. In sum, the institutional changes that medicine has gone through over the last century are 
dramatic, and it is not so clear whether medical ethics, as it is known today, embraces the 
complexities of these changes, especially when it predominantly is framed as ‘individual 
ethics’. In this article, I will show how the ambiguity of the interpretation of autonomy results 
in an ambivalence of what exactly moral claims are moral agents, namely patients, are faced 
with and I will then complement and, in part, juxtapose the principle of respect of autonomy 
with the medical professionals’ responsibility to care for a patient. Both concepts, however, 
cannot claim to address the social and institutional questions of today’s health care ethics, 
and hence I will conclude that to connect both concepts of autonomy and care with a social-
ethical approach to bioethics is the most challenging task ahead. 
Bioethics as an Answer to Societal Change in 20th Century 
Questions of bioethics are part of the broader ethical reflection that embraces different 
changes of social practices in modern societies. In the discipline of bioethics and biomedical 
ethics, which originated in Northern America in the 1950s,1 the shifts and changes of the 
medical practices due to the development and application of new technologies are examined 
in historical, cultural, or anthropological studies, including the analyses of the transformative 
processes and the emergence of new norms in different contexts. Sociological analyses 
describe societal changes, e.g. shifts with respect to values and beliefs, and psychological 
studies examine, among others, the impact of these changes on the personal identity, their 
coping strategies with illness, etc. In the traditional labor division between descriptive and 
normative disciplines, philosophy, theology and law are the classical disciplines to critically 
evaluate the normative dimension of practices by means of rational argumentation.  
While medical ethics has always been part of medical practice, it was newly 
constructed after World War II. It emerged as corrective to the crimes committed by 
physicians during the Nazi dictatorship, but with the development of new medical 
technologies, biomedical ethics began to add to the critique of disrespect for human rights the 
underlying paternalism in all traditional clinical medicine. Moreover, since individual 
                                                 
1 (Jonsen 1998). 
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freedom was largely considered to be the core social value of US society, relying on the 
physicians’ virtues and individual responsible behavior appeared not only to be dubious in 
light of the recent history but also seemed to contradict the freedom right of sovereign 
citizens in modern societies. Health care providers were more and more seen as providing the 
means for patients to realize their choices in situations of illness and disease. Furthermore, 
the principle of well-being, which had served as the over-arching norm of medical action for 
centuries and considered the core principle of traditional medical ethics, (articulated, for 
example, in the principle:  “Salus aegroti suprema lex”), seemed to belong to a paternalistic 
medical ethics rather than to the new framework of an autonomy-based ethics. While well-
being is certainly still guiding the physician’s every-day practice, it became, above all, a 
problem in the contested cases of biomedical ethics: especially in the conflicts concerning life 
and death, the course of action, it was held, should be determined by the patient rather than 
by the physician or anybody else. According to the revised biomedical ethics, respect for the 
patient’s autonomy is paramount in the doctor-patient-relationship and expected to create 
exactly the trust that is needed in this asymmetric relationship; in practice, however, this 
respect is often merely spelled out as the signature on the consent form. Nevertheless, respect 
for the patient’s autonomy reflects a radical change in the underlying concept of medical 
actions concerning the status of the traditional principle of well-being.  
The re-orientation of the traditional medical virtue ethics by way of the establishment 
of several institutional Codes of Conduct, political oversight of new technologies, and the re-
evaluation of traditional medical ethics was met by a major methodological 'milestone' when 
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress published their ‘Foundations of biomedical ethics’ in 
1977, which is now in its sixth edition, each of which responded to the critics of the 
approach.2 It was assumed that by constructing foundational “middle principles”, both the 
theoretical and practical needs of medical ethics could be met without burdening bioethics 
with the commitment to a particular moral tradition or religious belief system. The authors 
hoped that on the basis of plural traditions, the principles of bioethics could be negotiated and 
serve as a normative reference for the new discipline of bioethics. By aid of the four 
principles, autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice, norms were to be set up for 
most changed areas of medical practice, namely ethical issues at the beginning of life, at the 
end of life, or genetic testing. Together with legal norms, the principles were supposed to 
guide the clinical decision-making procedures ‘at the bedside’. From the beginning, however, 
legal-ethical deliberations dominated the debates, framing the bioethics discourse as analysis 
about a physician’s right action and the scope of legal regulations. In the very famous case of 
Karen Ann Quinlan, for example, her parents, the legal guardians, sought to end her treatment 
after several months because she had not responded to any effort to help her regain 
consciousness – the court ultimately ruled in favor of her parents’ wishes. This case became a 
test case for biomedical ethics in the new ‘era’ of life-sustaining technologies, and unless the 
more casuistic methodology of Catholic moral theology was applied, bioethical questions 
were framed in view of liberal political philosophy. Mostly, they were seen as conflicts 
between freedom rights on the one hand – hence respect for a patient’s autonomy (sometimes 
represented by her guardians) interpreted mainly as negative freedom right, i.e. the right not 
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to be hindered by the state or medical institution to act in accordance with her wishes – and 
protection rights on the other hand, i.e. an institution’s or state’s duty to protect the life and 
well-being of citizens. This conflict between different kinds of rights is not unusual in liberal 
political philosophy; what is not so clear, however, is whether this framework of political 
liberalism is appropriate in order to interpret modern medical ethical conflicts.  
Beauchamp and Childress’s book is certainly the best-known approach to biomedical 
ethics; it joins the long list of US American bioethics books that presuppose the modern 
liberal framework, even when disagreeing whether a more deontological or consequentialist 
approach should be taken. And although the book was critiqued from philosophers especially 
for its reliance on a ‘common morality’, with the spread of the discipline of bioethics to 
almost every country of the world, the underlying framework has become the most influential 
methodology within biomedical ethics. Moreover, very soon the "four principles approach" 
succeeded in providing an instrument to ethically structure complex ethical issues in such a 
way that they can be regulated. Given the heavy influence of the six editions of the book so 
far, it is probably not too far-fetched to say that it has had the intended effect, even though 
today, the question of just distribution of resources (and hence the question of political and 
economic ethics) and the challenge of global justice (and hence the relation of political ethics, 
governance, and economics) reflects a shift in the bioethics debate towards the methodologies 
of social and institutional ethics. Bioethics, it is claimed today from a Foucauldian 
perspective, is also always biopolitics, mirroring not only the historically contingent and ever 
shifting relation, for example, between religious communities and the state, but also the 
pragmatic focus of bioethics as consultant and adviser of political bodies. While these 
approaches claim that the clinical-ethical approach, which is centered on the physician-
patient relationship and their interaction, is far too narrow given the complexity of health care 
and governance of individual’s health, the principle of autonomy, as introduced in the early 
works of bioethics, is still considered to be the core principle of the discipline.3 
The critique of autonomy as preferential autonomy 
In the context of medicine the concept of what I will call preferential autonomy is defined as 
respect for the desire and the preferences of a patient – whatever these may be, limited solely 
by the respect for the preferences of others. This respect has replaced, as I said, the shared 
notion of ‘well-being’ that formed the basis of action in the traditional medical ethics. In that 
paradigm, it was the physician’s expertise that determined whether and how an illness or 
disease could be transformed into what Heinz Georg Gadamer called the ‘equilibrium’ of 
bodily functions and the subjective sense of ‘feeling healthy’.4 In this conceptual framework, 
the patient would trust the doctor or medical team to take care of the necessary steps to reach 
this status of equilibrium – or at least to try everything possible to restore his or her well-
being – at the price of not knowing or not understanding a physician’s actions.  As Onora 
O’Neill has argued convincingly, ‘trust’ is a necessary ingredient of the doctor-patient-
relationship,5 while mistrust is poisonous for a relationship that exposes the one partner to 
                                                 
3  For a good overview of the discussion on autonomy in bioethics cf. (Tauber 2005). 
4  Cf. (Gadamer 1996). 
5  Cf. (O'Neill 2002). 
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potentially painful physical and psychical interventions by the other – in a culture that values 
individual freedom highly, a return to the traditional virtue-ethics paradigm seems to be 
impossible unless it leaves enough space for information and consent. While this is not 
questioned, the exact interpretation of autonomy is subject to many contemporary debates. 
The concept of a patient’s preferential autonomy, which echoes the social value order 
of Western societies’ individualism, requires a medically and ethically competent patient: If 
the choice is considered as a patient’s self-determination of action, this changes the 
physician’s role dramatically, even reversing the asymmetry between the doctor and the 
patient in matters of ethical decisions. Again, in more traditional settings, this may not 
become a big problem, because it will still be the ‘well-being’ that drives the decision and the 
patient will most certainly rely upon the expertise of the physician. But in the biomedical 
setting of today’s health care provisions, this may easily change, because health and illness 
become much more ambiguous concepts: for example, in genetic testing, dispositions to 
develop diseases in the future may serve as cause for actions (preventive screenings, 
abortions, or preventive surgery are examples of such interventions), even though no actual 
disease is at stake. The ethical decision can therefore not be guided by a person’s well-being 
as equilibrium of health (already) disrupted by a disease; rather, the decision involves the 
assessment of risks and the probability of a disease to manifest; decisions may involve the 
assessment of one’s future quality of life, as this is, for example, the case in prospective 
living wills. In all these cases, medical experts can give statistical information, but since 
quality of life is difficult – if at all possible – to quantify, the necessary decisions do not only 
concern ‘objective’ criteria but rather individual preferences of how a person wishes to live 
with regard to possible medical options. In such a scenario that is rather the standard of 
biomedical decision-making than the exception, doctors and patients may in fact rather be 
‘moral strangers’ than sharing a social understanding of health and disease.6  
Since the value of an individual’s freedom to act is considered as the ‘highest good’ 
of the modern (Western) ethics that in return shapes the normative principle of respect, the 
flipside of the value of individual autonomy is therefore ethical pluralism. Tolerance or 
respect is the normative response to this pluralism. As a result, the dominant liberal medical 
ethics emphasizes the normative implication of autonomy for physicians or caregivers: they 
not only need to refrain from any action that could interfere with the patient’s own desire or 
interest but also from reasoning with the patient about underlying value judgments of their 
interests. Conversations are to be ‘non-directive’ lest they risk manipulating the patient’s 
sovereign choice. The effect of this change is a moral ‘neutralization’ of the doctor-patient 
relationship, and often health care institutions retreat to a formalized procedure to ensure a 
patient’s consent to medical interventions.  
Despite of the problems to implement appropriate procedures, preference autonomy 
seems to ‘fit’ well with modern societies.7 However, while individuals may interpret their 
preferences as 'authentic' desires, they are in fact socially mediated: preferences are at least in 
part shaped by social values and social norms. As I have argued, in an environment of ‘moral 
                                                 
6  For H.T. Engelhardt modern societies ‘produce’ moral strangers and this is a strong motive for him to 
establish the principle of respect for the autonomy of all in his influential book: (Engelhardt 1986). 
7  For a defense of preferentialism from a utilitarian perspective cf. (Singer 2011); for a critique of the 
‘modern self’ cf.(Taylor 1992, Taylor 1992). 
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strangers’ or moral pluralism, these mediations can hardly be addressed – but this does not 
mean that the ‘liberal self’ comes without attributes: the concept of preference autonomy 
implicitly (or explicitly) assumes that a patient is a particular agent: sovereign, free, and well 
able to choose among several goods. But this self-concept turns out to be merely an idealized 
image of the modern citizen that political liberalism has depicted; while political liberalism 
turns to the relation of the individual and the state, bioethical liberalism is heavily influenced 
by the citizen as participant in civil society. In modern societies, these are for a good part 
defined as market societies, in which the individual will cooperate with others while pursuing 
her own interests – and it is this social practice that liberal bioethics seems to presuppose, 
while transferring it to the sphere of health care. Preference autonomy may be an appropriate 
concept when applied to the consumer market, but it distorts the reality of patients in need of 
help, because it cannot attend to the vulnerability that accompanies illness, and it cannot 
attend to the constitutive relational and social character of human life. To this aspect, I will 
return below. But there are other reasons to question an over-simplified interpretation of the 
concept of autonomy from an ethical perspective:  
First, freedom as such may well serve as an anthropological concept to describe the 
conditio humana – but without further specification it cannot serve as a moral principle. For 
this reason, Immanuel Kant defined autonomy not along the line of individual preferences but 
rather along the line of moral reasoning: moral autonomy, as a basic category in moral 
philosophy, is the concordance of the agent’s moral maxims (the action-guiding, yet non-
categorical, preference-based principles) and the categorically binding moral law, which 
ought to be comprehensible by everyone; defining autonomy as the foundation of morality, 
Kant did not think of the individual’s freedom to pursue her happiness; rather, he addressed 
the freedom of a person to ‘construct’ the moral laws that regulate (and motivate) actions, 
analogue to natural laws that cause events to happen. The distinction between preferential 
autonomy and moral autonomy is therefore crucial: preferences as such have no moral 
qualification; hence it can be right or wrong to respect them. In contrast, moral autonomy is 
practical freedom, demanding not only that an agent herself acts morally (in accordance with 
the categorical principle, i.e. justified with a claim to universal validity) but also that she is 
respected in this ‘dignity’ – the capability to act morally.8   
In the last decades, this moral approach to autonomy was elaborated further from two 
important sides without turning to the concept of preferential autonomy. Discourse ethics 
critiqued the Kantian justification procedure for its monological structure of reasoning, and it 
transformed the process of reasoning to a dialogical procedure of deliberation, as 
argumentative discourse. Although this approach was developed as a political ethics, it can be 
useful for biomedical ethics, too: in clinical ethics, it is, for example, echoed in the concept of 
‘shared decision-making’, which transcends the imperative of non-directive interactions. 
Second and more radically, however, phenomenological ethics questioned the 
universalization of maxims. It takes up Kant’s turn to obligations and reformulates it as 
                                                 
8  In recent years, Ch. Korsgaard has supported O’Neill’s Kantian approach that prioritizes duties over rights, 
arguing that Kant’s ethics is not only necessary for moral reasoning, but it can indeed be constructed as a 
‘necessary’ part of a person’s self-identity. Cf. (Korsgaard 2009). 
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responsibility.9 In this approach, the response to the ‘other’ takes precedence over the self-
related actions that include the other via universalization only. In the bioethical context this 
means that both patients and health care providers need to ask what responsibilities arise in a 
given situation; a patient may even conceive of herself as other, resulting in the obligation to 
care for herself, while physicians will need to ask what they ‘owe the other’, the patient. 
Autonomy is thereby closely linked to the concept of responsibility; the latter, however, is 
better equipped to attend to a patient’s loss (or lack) of sovereignty that so often accompanies 
the experience of illness.  
A second reason to transcend the concept of preference autonomy concerns the 
concept of free choice in the context of health care services. Biotechnologies which have 
become more and more part of the current medical practice are a good example of the easily 
crossed line between the rhetoric of ‘free’ choice and the shaping of this choice by market 
strategies; for medical products are often very expensive, and they are predominantly owned 
by companies that need to make profit. Such companies have a vested interest to identify 
potential consumers for their biomedical products or procedures in preventive, diagnostic, 
and therapeutic medicine. Whatever is declared to be in the patient’s “interest”, is also part of 
and subject to a system of economic incentives and motifs, all based on the assumption that 
one will first develop the goods that then will find the consumer. Seen from the institutional 
or social-ethical perspective, however, individual choices are not only mediated socially but 
rather, needs are sometimes created rather than discovered, in order to create a market for its 
products.10 A powerful example of this dynamic within the medical sector is the drug Viagra 
that was developed as medication for a specific sexual condition, but once it marketed, it was 
broadly advertised as a lifestyle drug for an ageing male population. Within few years, the 
drug has radically changed the attitude towards and the perception of sex in an ageing 
society.11 Commodification, it seems, has also long taken the lead in reproductive 
technologies: For example, sex-selection in early pregnancy was developed as part of medical 
genetics to determine sex-related risks, as in Duchenne muscular dystrophy. By now, 
companies sell test kits for no more than $25 online. Adding lab fees and shipping costs, 
these tests can be bought for $250-300. According to a review study that was published in 
August 2011 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), non-invasive 
blood-tests are highly reliable with respect to the determination of the offspring’s sex; they 
may pave the way to offer future parents the choice to determine the sex of their future 
child.12 Furthermore, in several countries, the most popular of which is India that has a 
booming market in this area, children are purchased from surrogate mothers changing the 
‘conception’ of a child. With respect to enhancement technologies, biochemical or 
neurological stimulants are heavily marketed. As a clear-cut separation between patients’ 
needs and consumers’ interests is impossible, the distinction between treating a patient and 
                                                 
9  (Levinas 1998). For a more thorough analysis of the critique of liberal bioethics via an ethics of 
responsibility cf. (Haker 2008). 
10  Medical sociologist Peter Conrad argues that the transformation of the ‘traditional’ medicine to a market-
oriented medicine is the most striking feature of modern medicine – this analysis raises important questions 
for the concept of preferential autonomy as brought forward by Anglo-Saxon bioethics. I will return to this 
below. Cf. (Conrad 2005, Conrad 2008). 
11  Cf. (Loe 2004). 
12  (Devaney 2011). 
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satisfying a consumer is more and more blurred. Nevertheless, the rhetoric and health renders 
the marketing of new products or services more acceptable. Today, commodification in the 
health care sector is a challenge that bioethics must attend to in its overall analyses of 
individual autonomy.13 
A third argument that questions the interpretation of autonomy as preference 
autonomy concerns the cultural shaping of basic concepts of human existence by the so-
called life sciences. In contrast to the ever smaller role that cultural and religious traditions 
play in interpreting human existence, the scientific approach to human life in biology, though 
necessary within that discipline, becomes the dominant paradigm to understand human life – 
and shapes a new cultural understanding. For instance, in the 1960s, human death was 
defined as brain death, at least partly in order to enable organ transplantation, with the result 
that today ethical questions concerning the treatment of brain-dead persons predominantly 
concern the ‘harvesting’ of their organs and not, for example, new ways to deal with the 
dying person in a highly automated environment.14 In the Life Sciences, human body parts, 
tissue, or gametes are necessarily conceived as mere body material in order to have them 
available as medical resources; the existential perspective may easily be dismissed. From an 
ethical perspective, this necessarily reductionist scientific view must be complemented with 
the phenomenological insight of ‘embodiment’: a patient not only ‘has’ a body among other 
bodies; a patient ‘is’ her body that she experiences as ‘hers’ in a non-instrumental, 
experiential way.15 Given the dominant perspective of biology as normative framework in 
defining the meaning of human life, the human body becomes a crucial site of 
anthropological self-understanding. In Foucault´s analysis of power this dynamic has been 
appropriately described as “biopolitics.” The normative shifts are not based on power as 
domination but rather pass through the bodies of individuals. They are adopted “free-
willingly,” but still form “regimes of power,” which Foucault described as 
“governmentalities”.16 An ethics based purely on the respect of individual autonomy has no 
means by which it can analyze this self-induced dynamic of power.17 Bioethics must, 
however, be able to attend to the psychic, social and cultural dimensions which shape the 
overall understanding of human existence, and it needs to contextualize the life sciences’ 
perspective in this endeavor.  
Without a critical method of reflection of these dynamics, ethics loses its capacity for 
the normative analysis and assessment that ultimately is aimed at orientating individual 
agents in their actions. Contrary to philosophers who want to merely embrace the Kantian 
concept of moral autonomy, I am convinced that Kant’s approach alone is not sufficient to 
normatively address, for example, the commercialization of biomedicine and the cultural 
transformation of our societies by way of the life-sciences.  
                                                 
13  (Honneth 2008), (Dickenson 1997, Dickenson 2009). 
14  The role of relatives in the process of determining the brain death of a person is almost always reduced to 
the decision about organ transplantation; the dramatic experience of the death of a beloved person in the 
environment of an IUC is not part of the debate and left to psychological studies. Ethics, however, also 
concerns the ‘ars moriendi’ and includes practices of accompanying a person’s death. In the legal-ethical 
framing of bioethical questions, there is not much room for such reflections.  
15  (Vetlesen 2009, Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
16  (Burchell 1991). 
17  The dialectic of power as both heteronous and  self-constituting feature is explored further by (Butler 
1997). 
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Care for the ‘vulnerable’ as corrective of an ethics of autonomy? 
Let me now very shortly turn to the ethics of care. For the last decades, the ethics of the 
liberal understanding of autonomy has been criticized from yet another angle that I have not 
presented so far: feminist ethics as well as several religious ethics approaches claimed that 
the emphasis on autonomy ignores the relatedness and interdependency of persons.18 
Furthermore, these critics hold that the autonomy model stresses a self-confident agent who 
knows what he wants (sic!) and demands that his interests are met by caregivers and medical 
professionals – all this in a situation that is in fact more defined in terms of dependency, 
vulnerability, and suffering than by the sovereignty of agency that the autonomy concept 
suggests. As much as respect is needed in order to acknowledge the freedom-rights of 
patients, their need for the care provided by others must not be forgotten. Starting with 
different kinds of inter-relations between persons, their inter-dependency and the specific 
vulnerability of patients in the context of medical services, the ethics of care concludes: 
ethical reflection must not start with the assumption of an ‘atomic’, i.e. un-related, a-social 
self-determination. As I have said above, phenomenological ethics, too, has presented a 
radical critique of autonomy as conceptual starting point of either the self or of ethics, 
reversing ethical reflection from the ‘ethics of the self’ to an ‘ethics of the other’, or an ethics 
of responsibility. This reversal seems to resonate well with some newer versions of an ethics 
of care, because it precludes bioethics from being received as just the return to an ethics of 
common values, shared understandings of well-being or ‘objective’ standards of care. Even if 
the concept of individual autonomy may be useful in other contexts, ethicists have claimed 
that it misrepresents the existential status of a person who in the medical context has turned 
into a patient. 
But it is not only the reversal from rights to needs and responsibilities that matters in 
care ethics. Defenders of this approach argue that different kinds of principle-based moral 
theories are constrained by the rationalistic frameworks of justification so that they miss the 
point of moral practice.19 Ethics, they claim, concerns the sometimes monological, more often 
dialogical or collective deliberation about the appropriate response to a given situation – and 
this response cannot be found in a textbook of normative reasoning but needs to be partly 
informed by the given situation, the persons involved, and the ‘creative imagination’ about 
the patient’s well-being.20 According to this approach, the patient’s right to be cared for (i.e. 
to be assisted in her autonomy, flourishing or well-being) transforms into a positive duty: it is 
not enough only to passively respect the other’s needs but they must be met by way of action, 
response. This response, however, must be acted out as ‘responsible response’. Since any 
action needs to be justified, the patients’ needs, the agents’ values and conviction, 
professional standards, ethical principles and legal constraints all enter into the ethical 
                                                 
18  Cf., among others, the following studies that emphasize the concept of care: (Clement 1996, Conradi 2001, 
Donchin 1999, Held 1995, Levine 2001, Mackenzie 2000, Kittay Feder 2002). 
19  Cf. for a summary: (Dodds 2007). 
20  I call this ‘creative imagination’ because I do not believe that we always have clear understandings of what 
our well-being may involve. However, in a given situation that constrains the scope of action by various 
conditions, I am convinced we come up with at least the relevant factors of well-being. Yet, we may well 
prioritize the elements differently. But that is a concern for the actual decision-making process and not for 
the notion of our well-being.  
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analysis;  the patient’s perspective alone is certainly not to overrule all other deliberations, 
while his or her dignity, spelled out in specific rights, is in fact inalienable.21  
So, if care ethics is concerned with responsible responses that are meant to meet the 
needs of another person – how are these defined? Susan Dodds argues that care is still to be 
oriented towards a person’s or patient’s autonomy:  
 
The provision of care can be defined as activity undertaken with the aim of providing 
an individual with the social, material and emotional supports that either allow that 
person to flourish as far as is possible, or (as far as possible) to bring the life of a 
person with some recognized physical, cognitive, psychological disability into a 
position where their autonomy can be realized.22  
Dodds is quick to add that autonomy is not always the goal of care. In some cases it may well 
be a rather restricted meaning of flourishing, as is the case in the care for persons with severe 
mental disabilities, or people in the so-called persistent vegetative status, or persistent coma. 
Dodds’ normative basis, however, is the claim that the existential vulnerability relates the 
care-giver to the care-receiver in an un-altruistic way because of the underlying inter-
dependency or a shared vulnerability that differs only in times and degrees of the need. Most 
care-ethicists seem to share this view.  
As much as this re-turn to the concern for the patients’ needs can be embraced, it can 
be doubted whether its inherent focus on personal relationships can address the current 
challenges of the medical system. Rather, a systemic, ‘managerial’ ethics has taken over, it 
has been argued, “setting the stage for formations of collective actions by a large number of 
individuals”,23 whose individual actions must be organized and coordinated. Furthermore, 
contrary to its’ proponents’ implicit assumption of inter-dependency, its normative status in 
medical ethics is at least as unclear as in the counterpart approach of an ethics of autonomy.24 
For care ethics may easily fall into two traps: first, caregivers may take the patient’s 
articulation of her need as the guiding norm of their provision of care – in this case it is not 
different from taking serious a patient’s interests as articulated in the liberal autonomy-based 
ethics; second, the caregiver might determine the patient’s needs herself and shape the 
content, scope and limits of what she considers to be a responsible care without giving the 
patient’s voice priority. The only circumvention of the first trap is to engage the patient in a 
conversation about needs, rights, and obligations, the threshold of acceptable actions and the 
limits of what the caregiver is able or willing to give. This could be called a hermeneutical 
process about the specific needs and actions, including values, rights, duties, and respect on 
both sides. This brings us back to a critical hermeneutics that tries to decipher the social 
norms that may inform the emergence of needs, and the competency to weigh the personal 
narratives to the normative, universalistic rights’ perspective.  
To avoid the second trap, paternalism, is certainly more difficult when a 
hermeneutical conversation cannot take place, and imagination or empathy must complement 
                                                 
21  Cf. for a recent collection of essays concerning the theory of dignity and its possible foundational status in 
bioethics (Pellegrino 2009). 
22  (Dodds 2007), p. 501. 
23  (Stirrat 2005), p. 128. 
24  For an insightful critique of common care-ethical approaches cf. (Paley 2011). 
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the normative reflection. This may be the case when patients are not able to articulate their 
needs due to their medical condition, their young age, or mental capability. Since we can 
almost always presuppose that patients are not unrelated beings but embedded in different 
webs of relations, it may often be feasible to consult with these relevant other persons, and 
bioethics has developed (along the lines of an autonomy-based ethics) the so-called standard 
of best interest that care ethics may counter with the standard of best care. The normative 
limit of the care-ethics, however, is the same as it is for the ethics of autonomy: this is the 
inalienable dignity of the patient that must be respected, and that must be particularly 
respected in situations of increased vulnerability. Everything is dependent, then, on how we 
can conceive of dignity in the context of bioethics, and moreover, how dignity is spelled out 
in different kinds of human rights. 
The return of the question of methods 
The limits of both autonomy and care ethics approaches show that bioethics needs to broaden 
the methodological framework within which medical-ethical questions are negotiated. I see a 
trend in contemporary approaches to bioethics to rather describing various individual values 
and social norms than normatively evaluating them. Ignoring this specific task, more and 
more empirical studies replace normative analyses; they tacitly operate on the belief that a) 
since pluralistic societies need to respect the patient’s will, empirical studies can shed light on 
what individuals think; furthermore, surveys exploring a population’s stance on particular 
practices are instruments of deciphering social values and norms; these, in turn, are taken as 
an important basis for legal regulations in democratic societies. The flaw of this approach is 
not so much that its informative value is limited – this holds true of any empirical study or 
poll; rather it confuses the majority votes with the validity of moral claims. A critical ethics 
based on the foundational principle of dignity and human rights cannot knuckle down to 
majority views; rather, it has to argue for the justification of moral claims. Many studies in 
bioethics overlook this task of normative justification altogether. But while ethics certainly 
needs to interpret existential experiences and social practices, it also needs to offer a 
normative framework to determine, for example, the correlation of freedom and 
responsibility.  
Certainly, descriptive and comparative studies are an indispensable part of what I call 
a critical hermeneutical ethics. As such, bioethical approaches and approaches in cultural 
anthropology, ethnology and social sciences will coexist parallel to each other, and they will 
strive to overcome the current deficit that often exists because they remain unconnected.25 
However, in addition to the descriptive depiction of normative orders or the critical analysis 
of social practices, the reflection on normativity is indispensable. Hence, the critical 
hermeneutical ethics is to be complemented with a normative ethics that I call a historically 
sensitive universalistic human rights approach. 
A number of bioethicists who have confronted the question of normativity refer to a 
theory of a deliberative democracy, leaving foundational ethical questions to a discourse 
model of decision-making. But as much as this may be a possible (democratic) procedure for 
political decisions, it does not suffice for the bioethical normative reflection. Insofar as ethics 
                                                 
25  (Durante 2009). 
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is not political theory, even though both disciplines of philosophy are connected in their 
objects of research, the equation of consensus and the justification of moral claims is flawed. 
For, to mention but one critique of any kind of discourse ethics, which is raised by feminist 
ethics as well as critical ethics: the emphasis on discourse is not as innocent as it appears to 
be, because it underestimates the factual power relations and power structures, especially 
with respect to the fundamental categories of sex, class, or race.26 This deficiency seems to 
shake the entire architecture of a procedural ethics that is founded on the capability to 
articulate one’s claims in the public realm, and brings us back to the underlying conflict of an 
ethics of autonomy and an ethics of responsibility. Although I certainly cannot argue for it 
here, I believe that the most promising resolution to this methodological dilemma is a 
combination of a critical hermeneutics (that examines the factual inequalities, social norms 
and normative orders) and the universalistic human rights approach (that is the underlying 
framework of discourse ethics, too, which is constructed to secure the freedom rights of any 
participant in social practices). 
For such a qualified universalism based on human rights theories, the varying 
contexts are acknowledged in informing the understanding of “human existence”. The 
fundamental principle of this approach is human dignity, spelled out in the various kinds of 
human rights: basic rights, protection rights, freedom rights, and claim rights. The advantage 
of this approach rests on the fact that human rights ethics does not necessarily assume the 
theoretical coherence of values but takes at its starting point the historically established 
human rights frameworks. They refer, for example, to the qualified and codified catalogue of 
Human Rights Declarations, which the vast majority of nations have acknowledged and 
confirmed – and which are open to additions and further differentiation. In my own view, the 
normative implications of historical, yet critical reasoning must be spelled out more 
specifically in this endeavor,27 and this can only be done in closely examining and adhering to 
historical experiences: as the origin of human rights lies in a specific European tradition and 
historical experience, this can and should be explicated and articulated. This origin does not 
weaken the justification, to the contrary, it strengthens it: instead of viewing human rights in 
terms of a naturalization of ultimately Eurocentric values, their origin ought to serve as a 
point of departure in a dialogical process of understanding and appreciation, contextualizing 
the normative framework within a specific historical experience it and opening it up to 
comparative studies. Justification of normative claims cannot be successful without this turn 
to historical reason; but historical experiences alone cannot legitimize moral claims without 
turning to a concept of ‘qualified universalism’ that is grounded in the equality of all human 
beings but takes its starting point in the experience of injustice.28 While this normative 
                                                 
26  For a defense of this Kantian-based and yet procedural normative ethics, see (Forst 2007), and a critique of 
it in (Honneth 2011). 
27  (Honneth 2011). 
28  Cf. (Shklar 1990).This is where the theological-ethics discourse should be located as well. The Christian 
ethical “Option for the Poor” refers to a theologically grounded partiality, which focuses ethical attention 
on marginalization and exclusion, on unequal structures and the perpetuation of unequal balances of power. 
This ethical focus within the Christian ethic is connected to the attribute of God´s compassion and concern 
for justice, which translates into a practical involvement and engagement for others (Haker 2001). On a 
personal level, compassion means a concern for oneself and others; on the societal level, it means active 
solidarity with discriminated groups in achieving and reviving recognition: (Haker 2009); and on the 
institutional level of justice policies, it must be spelled out as negation of injustices. Injustices, not justice, 
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reflection concerns the very foundation of ethics as such, we can still try to see whether we 
may use it as the starting point of the normative reflection in bioethics, too.  
In conclusion, I would hold that neither autonomy nor care ethics approaches are clear 
concepts that should be used as foundational concepts of bioethics. Rather, they capture 
certain aspects that may better be translated into the language of moral agency and 
responsibility. One of the most challenging questions bioethics has yet to solve is how agency 
and responsibility can be translated into the realm of institutional respect (for agency) and 
responsibility as justice. I have suggested that further work is therefore needed in order to 
develop the complementary approach of a critical hermeneutics and normative bioethics 
based on human dignity and human rights.  
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